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Abstract 
 
This essay compares the role given to the concept of economic 
reality in New Zealand and Canadian cross-border tax arbitrage 
decisions, particularly Alesco and Mark Resources. Alesco and 
Mark Resources both address the problem of drawing the line 
between acceptable tax mitigation and unacceptable avoidance, 
and adopt economic substance as a key indicator of where this 
line lies. This essay considers how the concept of economic 
reality pervades these cases and evaluates the influence of 
legislative and judicial context to the significance afforded to 
the concept of economic reality in the two decisions, as well as 
reviewing how the economic realities jurisprudence has 
evolved following these cases. 
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I. Introduction: Avoidance and Cross-Border Arbitrage 
 
This essay considers the role of economic reality in 
determining when cross-border tax arbitrage might be 
considered tax avoidance, with particular reference to the New 5 
Zealand and Canadian cases of Alesco New Zealand v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue and Mark Resources Inc. v 
Her Majesty the Queen.1 
     The concept of tax avoidance is notoriously difficult to 
capture in a concise definition,2 and the terminology used to 10 
describe the concept can vary considerably.3 However, Brown 
offers an effective starting point for understanding the central 
tension between avoidance and mitigation:4 
 
Tax avoidance involves arrangement of a transaction in order 15 
to obtain a tax advantage, benefit, or reduction in a manner 
unintended by the tax law. It is an unacceptable manipulation 
of the law which is unlike legitimate tax mitigation. 
 
Cross-border tax arbitrage refers to a situation where a 20 
transaction is subject to the law of two different jurisdictions, 
allowing taxpayers to engage in tax planning that exploits any 
profitable asymmetries or inconsistencies between the two 
national systems in order to lower the taxpayer’s liability.5 
Particularly since the 1990s, cross-border tax arbitrage 25 
arrangements have become more prevalent,6 and 
correspondingly attracted considerable attention and scrutiny, 
with the activities of many taxpayers being viewed as abusive 
forms of tax avoidance.
7
 Many instances of cross-border 
arbitrage arrangements have been held to cross the elusive 30 
                                                     
1 Alesco New Zealand v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2013] NZCA 40, 
[2013] 2 NZLR 175; Mark Resources Inc. v Her Majesty the Queen (1993) 
93 DTC 1004. 
2 Michael Littlewood “The Privy Council and the Australasian Anti-
Avoidance Rules” [2007] BTR 175 at 175 (“That tax avoidance is one of the 
slipperiest ideas in the whole of the law is notorious”). 
3 For instance, Ben Nevis dismissed the distinction between “avoidance” and 
“mitigation” as being “conclusory and unhelpful”, below n 53, at [95]. 
4 Karen B. Brown A Comparative Look at Regulation of Corporate Tax 
Avoidance (Volume 12 of Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law 
and Justice, Springer, 2012) at 1; See also John Prebble and Zoe Prebble 
“The Morality Of Tax Avoidance” (2010) 43:3 Creighton L Rev 693 at 705 
(John and Zoe Prebble provided the genesis for this definition adopted by 
Brown).  
5 Daniel Shaviro “Money on the Table?: Responding to Cross-Border Tax 
Arbitrage” (2002) 3 Chi J Int'l L 317 at 319. 
6 Stephen A. Whittington and John Prebble “Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage 
and Convergence of Tax Systems: A Law and Economics Approach” (paper 
presented to the Australasian Tax Teachers’ Association Annual 
Conference, Sydney, January 2012) at 4.  
7 Daniel Shaviro “More Revenues, Less Distortion? Responding To Cross-
Border Tax Arbitrage” (2004) 1 NYU J L & Bus 113. 
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dividing line between acceptable mitigation and unacceptable 
avoidance in both New Zealand and Canada,8 including the 
Alesco and Mark Resources cases. 
     Certainly, cross-border arbitrage, like other methods of 
avoidance, can pose a great threat to domestic tax bases. The 5 
consequences of unbridled cross-border arbitrage may include a 
reduction in tax compliance, an inequitable distribution of tax 
liabilities, interference with government policies, as well as 
overall global economic inefficiencies.
9
  
     Canada and New Zealand are no exception to this growing 10 
problem, and they both have been subject to increasingly 
aggressive forms of cross-border arbitrage. Indeed, in New 
Zealand, the “bank conduit” cross-border arbitrage cases still 
stand as the largest avoidance cases in the country’s history.10 
The Government of Canada is also alert to this problem, and is 15 
proposing new information reporting requirements to address 
what it acknowledges to be an increasingly troubling trend of 
avoidance.
11
 
     The differences between taxation systems that provide the 
scope for international tax arbitrage tend to be intractable 20 
because they often stem from deliberately divergent or 
competitive policy choices made within the context of distinct 
political systems.12 These differences can lead to double 
taxation where the domestic regimes overlap, or a reduction or 
absence of taxation where there is a gap.13  Cross-border 25 
asymmetries that lead to double taxation have typically driven 
increased measures of multilateral harmonisation, particularly 
in the form of double tax treaties. However, in the case of 
asymmetries leading to a reduction or even an absence of 
                                                     
8 In New Zealand, see BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (2009) CIV-2004-485-1059 (HC), 24 NZTC 23; Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2009) CIV-2005-404-2843 
(HC), 24 NZTC 23. In Canada, see: Lehigh Cement Limited v The Queen 
(2013) TCC 176; Paul Antle v Her Majesty The Queen (2009) TCC 465. 
9 Robert McMechan Economic Substance and Tax Avoidance: An 
International Perspective (Carswell, Canada, 2013) at 41-55; Stephen A. 
Whittington and John Prebble “Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage and 
Convergence of Tax Systems: A Law and Economics Approach” (paper 
presented to the Australasian Tax Teachers’ Association Annual 
Conference, Sydney, January 2012). 
10 John Prebble “Tax Avoidance, International Tax Arbitrage, and New 
Zealand as a Haven for Foreign Capital and Income” (2010) 16 Revue 
Juridique Polynesienne 169 at 171; Michael Littlewood “Tax Avoidance, 
the Rule of Law and the New Zealand Supreme Court” (2011) 1 NZLR 35. 
11 McMechan, above n 9, at 41-42. 
12 Diane M. Ring “One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of 
Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage” 44 BCL Rev 79 at 88. 
13 Ring, above n 12, at 88; Angelo Nikolakakis “The Unthinkable Anathema 
of Double Non-Taxation: The Relevance and Implications of Foreign Tax 
Considerations in the Context of Applying GAAR” (2010) 58 Can Tax J 
243. 
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taxation, the responsibility has typically fallen on the domestic 
regimes where the tax base is challenged, rather than being 
dealt with through international laws.14 Tax authorities apply 
domestic law to combat avoidance and protect the national tax 
base, rather than seeking to prevent the more global effects of 5 
non-permissible arbitrage avoidance. Accordingly, tax arbitrage 
arrangements are considered avoidance only where 
inconsistencies between regimes are used in a way that offends 
the purpose or contemplation of the particular domestic 
legislature. Consequently, in both Canada and New Zealand, 10 
the courts and the legislature have developed various tools to 
combat the challenge posed to national tax bases from cross-
border arbitrage, including specific measures targeted at 
particular instances of tax arbitrage, and increasingly 
prominently, general anti-avoidance rules.   15 
     The New Zealand and Canadian cases of Alesco and Mark 
Resources both present striking examples of international tax 
arbitrage that has been held to be avoidance. This essay will 
compare these two cases and their approach to cross-border 
arbitrage. The arguments and reasoning in Alesco and Mark 20 
Resources illustrate a wider trend towards emphasising 
economic substance as the most prominent hallmark of 
avoidance, particularly in cross-border arbitrage. The essay will 
consider the significant influence of the legislative and judicial 
context in New Zealand and Canada and evaluate whether the 25 
trend towards a greater emphasis on economic reality is both 
theoretically supportable and consistent with the Canadian and 
New Zealand contexts.  
 
II. New Zealand and Canadian Statutes Applied 30 
 
Alesco and Mark Resources took place in different 
jurisdictions, at distinct stages in each jurisdiction’s developing 
approach to avoidance. Nevertheless, while the legislation that 
the two cases were decided under is different in form, 35 
ultimately, the underlying issue that the statutes address is how 
acceptable tax mitigation is to be distinguished from 
unacceptable avoidance. Erlichman notes the functional 
equivalence of the statutes, stating that “though framed 
differently, the Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand anti-40 
avoidance statutes clearly have the same general intent”.15  
     In New Zealand, Alesco attracted section BG 1 of the 
Income Tax Act 1994, which the 2007 Act identically 
                                                     
14 Ring, above n 12, at 106.  
15 Harry Erlichman “Tax Avoidance in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, 
and Australia” in David G. Duff and Harry Erlichman (eds) Tax Avoidance 
In Canada After Canada Trustco and Matthew (Irwin Law Inc, Toronto, 
2007) 181 at 183. 
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replicates. The section is referred to as the general anti-
avoidance rule, or ɢᴀᴀʀ. It provides that “A tax avoidance 
arrangement is void as against the Commissioner for income 
tax purposes”.16 Section OB 1 further defined a “tax avoidance 
arrangement”.
17
  5 
     The statutory phrasing of the ɢᴀᴀʀ is imprecise and 
tautologous; adding little to the circular idea that a tax 
avoidance arrangement is one that avoids tax. Much writing 
has been devoted to either critiquing the ambiguity or 
justifying the necessity of the imprecision.18 New Zealand 10 
courts have also recognised the inescapable uncertainty of the 
provision, with the Supreme Court in Glenharrow holding that 
“it is simply not possible to meet the objectives of a general 
anti-avoidance provision by the use, for example, of precise 
definitions”.19 Whatever the normative conclusions reached 15 
regarding the effectiveness of the statutory definition, it is 
apparent that the ɢᴀᴀʀ leaves the New Zealand courts with a 
significant role in determining what tax avoidance is. The wide 
discretion also paves the way for an analysis based on 
economic reality.  20 
     In Canada, Mark Resources was dealt with under two 
different sections of the Canadian Income Tax Act;
20
 paragraph 
20(1)(c) and paragraph 245(1). The successful challenge to the 
taxpayer arose under paragraph 20(1)(c), which allowed a 
deduction for: 21 25 
 
(c) an amount paid in the year or payable in respect of the 
year (depending on the method regularly followed by the 
taxpayer in computing the taxpayer’s income), pursuant to 
a legal obligation to pay interest on 30 
(i) borrowed money used for the purpose of earning 
income from a business or property (other than borrowed 
money used to acquire property the income from which 
would be exempt or to acquire a life insurance policy). 
 35 
In effect, paragraph 20(1)(c) provided that a deduction was 
available for borrowed money used for the purpose of earning 
income from a business or property. The Minister argued that 
the borrowed funds had not been used for the purpose of 
earning income from a business or property.  40 
     Additionally, the Minister challenged the deduction of 
                                                     
16 Income Tax Act 2007, s BG 1. 
17 See Appendix. The section is now replaced by the Income Tax Act 2001, 
s YA 1. 
18 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble “Does The Use Of General Anti-
Avoidance Rules To Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule 
of Law?” (2012) 2 VUWLRP 8. 
19 Glenharrow Holdings Ltd v CIR [2007] NZSC 116, at [48]. 
20 Income Tax Act RSC 1952 c 148, para 245(1). 
21 Income Tax Act RSC 1952 c 148, para 20(1)(c). 
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interest on the basis that it resulted in an artificial reduction of 
interest under paragraph 245(1). Following Mark Resources, 
paragraph 245(1) was repealed and replaced by a general anti-
avoidance provision, adding Canada to the steadily increasing 
number of countries with such a rule.
22
  5 
     The Canadian ɢᴀᴀʀ, introduced in 1998, generally applies 
to transactions entered into after 13 September of that year. 
Thus, Mark Resources was decided under the earlier section 
because it concerned deductions made for the 1985 and 1986 
tax years. The move towards a ɢᴀᴀʀ may be interpreted as 10 
evidence of the Canadian Government’s increasing preference 
for consideration of the substantive effects of a transaction, 
above the legal form, because the ɢᴀᴀʀ, in theory, confers 
greater freedom upon the court to look behind the form of the 
transaction. Nevertheless, paragraph 245(1) essentially acted as 15 
a statutory precursor to the ɢᴀᴀʀ that served a similar purpose 
of countering unacceptable tax avoidance, except that the 
paragraph applied to deductions only,
23
 whereas the ɢᴀᴀʀ can 
apply to any tax avoidance arrangement. Under paragraph 
245(1), the avoidance inquiry was primarily determined under 20 
the heading of artificiality. It provided that: 24 
 
In computing income for the purposes of this Act, no 
deduction may be made in respect of a disbursement or 
expense made or incurred in respect of a transaction or 25 
operation that, if allowed, would unduly or artificially 
reduce the income. 
 
Thus, the Canadian rule under paragraph 245(1) was essentially 
equivalent to the New Zealand rule in BG 1. The differences 30 
between legislation become relevant insofar as they support 
differing approaches to economic reality, with the existence of 
a ɢᴀᴀʀ arguably directing a greater deference to economic 
reality. The complementary relationship between the ɢᴀᴀʀ and 
an economic reality analysis is illustrated by a comparison of 35 
Alesco, which was determined under a section similar to the 
Canadian ɢᴀᴀʀ’s predecessor in paragraph 245(1), and Mark 
Resources, which was analysed with greater difficulty under 
paragraph 20(1)(c), where the paragraph did not lend itself as 
fluidly to the consideration of economic reality.  40 
 
                                                     
22 Other countries with a ɢᴀᴀʀ include Australia, South Africa, Norway, 
France, Germany, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
23 See also Brian J. Arnold “In Praise of the Business Purpose Test” (Report 
of Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Tax Conference, Toronto, 1988) at 10 
(“Even on a superficial examination, it does not apply to deductions in 
computing taxable income, deductions in computing tax payable, or 
transactions that artificially reduce income but do not involve deductions”).  
24 Income Tax Act RSC 1952 c 148, para 245(1). 
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III. The Meaning of “Economic Reality” 
 
“Economic reality” has been interpreted differently in a variety 
of cases and contexts. Neither Canada nor New Zealand has 
formalised an economic substance consideration within the 5 
anti-avoidance provisions, unlike the United States, which has a 
codified doctrine of economic substance.25  
     All taxation systems necessarily involve a discrepancy, 
often referred to as ectopia,
26
 between the true economic 
income of an entity and what is actually subject to taxation 10 
under the particular taxation system. The notion of true 
economic income refers to a wide understanding of the 
accretion of wealth, as compared to the narrow understanding 
adopted for taxation purposes. Having accepted the gap 
between the legal and economic concept of income, reasoning 15 
based on economic reality emphasises the underlying economic 
results of the arrangement, stressing a substance-over-form 
approach.
27
 In most contexts, “economic reality” and 
“economic substance” mean much the same.  
     Legal “substance” and economic “substance” are distinct.28  20 
Legal substance-over-form refers to the true legal obligations 
and relationships of an arrangement prevailing over the form or 
labels given to a transaction. For example, labelling a business 
relationship a partnership will not make it one unless it fulfils 
the substantive, underlying legal rights and requirements for a 25 
partnership. In contrast to legal substance, economic substance 
will look beyond the legal characteristics of a relationship or 
transaction to its true economic consequences. For example, 
even if an instrument was labelled and treated as “debt” for the 
non-tax purposes of commercial law, the instrument could be 30 
considered equity if it has the economic characteristics of 
equity. Consequently, following the economic substance 
approach, interest paid by the issuer of the instrument would 
not be deductible.   
 35 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
25 Section 1409 of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010 amended section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and 
inserted a new section clarifying the economic substance doctrine, which 
was previously a common law doctrine.  
26 John Prebble “Ectopia, Formalism, and Anti-Avoidance Rules in Income 
Tax Law” (1994) 1 VUWLRP 27.  
27 Whittington and Prebble, above n 6, at 13. 
28 Jinyan Li “’Economic Substance’: Drawing the Line Between Legitimate 
Tax Minimization and Abusive Tax Avoidance” (2006) 54(1) Can Tax J 23 
at 43. 
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IV. Alesco and Mark Resources: An Outline 
 
 Facts of Alesco  A.
 
Alesco Corporation (Alesco) was the Australian parent of 5 
Alesco New Zealand Ltd. (Alesco ɴᴢ). In 2003, Alesco ɴᴢ 
bought two other New Zealand companies; Biolab Ltd and 
Robinson Industries Ltd. Before the purchase, Alesco sought 
advice from the accounting firm ᴋᴘᴍɢ on how to structure the 
acquisition to reduce tax. Alesco adopted the “Hybrid 10 
Instrument into New Zealand” (ʜɪɴᴢ) product that was 
suggested. The ʜɪɴᴢ involved Alesco funding the acquisition of 
the New Zealand businesses by providing $78 million to 
Alesco ɴᴢ. In return, Alesco ɴᴢ issued three separate series of 
optional convertible notes (ᴏᴄɴs) to Alesco. The ᴏᴄɴs were 15 
non-interest bearing and issued for a fixed period of ten years at 
a price of $1 each. At the end of the ten years, Alesco had the 
option of redeeming the notes for cash or converting them into 
shares; that is, Alesco could be repaid the $78 million or could 
convert the notes into 78 million shares in Alesco ɴᴢ.  20 
     In New Zealand, instruments like the ᴏᴄɴs, which contain 
elements of both debt and equity, are generally subject to the 
financial arrangement rules.29 The purpose behind these rules is 
to impose spreading methods to financial arrangements so that 
income and expenditure is accrued on a “fair and reasonable 25 
basis” that allows for the time value of money.30 The spreading 
methods allocate an appropriate amount of the total income and 
expenditure of the financial arrangement to each income year 
of the arrangement’s term, without having to determine 
whether a return should be classified as income or capital. The 30 
spreading methods provide for a fairer and more reasonable 
                                                     
29 Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] 2 
NZLR 252 (HC) at [97]. 
30 Income Tax Act 2007, s EW 1(3). 
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treatment of certain debt instruments than the general rule that 
allocates income to the income year in which it is derived.31    
     The financial arrangement rules are further subject to 
determinations released by the Commissioner.32 Determinations 
ensure that the financial arrangement rules remain operable in 5 
particular circumstances where the rules are too generalised to 
apply properly. Determination G22,33 which was replaced with 
determination G22A following Alesco,34 stipulated a formula 
for splitting the ᴏᴄɴs into debt and equity, which Alesco used to 
determine the amount that would be deductible under the 10 
financial arrangement rules. Taken together, determination G22 
and the financial arrangement rules deem an interest cost to be 
paid by the issuer of the ᴏᴄɴs, even in the absence of an actual 
interest liability, because the value is determined according to 
the difference between the maturity value and the net present 15 
value of the debt component. 
     Applied to the Alesco case, this meant that Alesco ɴᴢ 
applied determination G22 to split the ᴏᴄɴs into debt and equity 
components. Although the ᴏᴄɴ instrument was more like equity 
in terms of economic substance, the financial arrangement rules 20 
adopt a hybrid characterisation. The net present value of the 
debt component was calculated with reference to the 
government stock rate for a ten-year term, consistent with the 
ten-year term of the ᴏᴄɴs. The calculated present value of $38 
million was subtracted from the maturity value of the debt of 25 
$78 million, to leave $40 million, which was treated as the 
equity element. In essence, determination G22 split the $78 
million from the ᴏᴄɴs into debt and equity components of $38 
million and $40 million respectively and spread the $40 million 
over the term of the debt.  The $40 million equity component 30 
was considered “expenditure incurred” under the financial 
arrangement rules and treated by Alesco ɴᴢ as deductible 
interest, under the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act. 
                                                     
31 Income Tax Act 2007, s BD 3. 
32 Tax Administration Act 1994, s 90AC. 
33 New Zealand Tax Regulations and Determinations “Determination G22: 
Optional convertible notes denominated in New Zealand dollars” (CCH 
New Zealand Limited, 2013), 424. 
34 New Zealand Tax Regulations and Determinations “Determination G22A: 
Optional convertible notes denominated in New Zealand dollars” (CCH 
New Zealand Limited, 2013), 436. 
The Court of Appeal observed at [145] that G22A, which was enacted 
following Alesco on 26 September 2006, “used explicit and unambiguous 
terms to exclude the operation of the debt and equity separation 
methodology contained in G22 when applied to ᴏᴄɴs issued between wholly 
owned group members”. This point was advanced in argument by counsel 
for Alesco, who argued that the Commissioner’s clarification that this 
methodology did not apply in the case of intragroup transfers illustrates that 
the position prior to this change was arguably contrary to the change. 
12 
 
     The Commissioner treated the result as a tax avoidance 
arrangement under s BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 1994 (the 
equivalent of the 2007 section) and declared the interest 
deductions claimed by Alesco between 2003 and 2008 to be 
void. The High Court and Court of Appeal upheld the 5 
Commissioner’s view.35 
 
 Facts of Mark Resources B.
 
 10 
Similarly, Mark Resources involved intragroup transactions 
between a parent company and its foreign subsidiary that 
resulted in the deduction of interest expenses. The appellant, 
Mark Resources, was the successor of a Canadian company, 
Precision Drilling Ltd (ᴘᴅʟ). In 1979, ᴘᴅʟ incorporated a 15 
wholly owned subsidiary, Precision Drilling Incorporated, ᴘᴅɪ, 
in America. ᴘᴅɪ did not succeed and instead accumulated 
business losses of ᴜs $707,000, meaning that it essentially 
became a shell company. ᴘᴅɪ’s only value lay latently in its 
losses, if they could be utilised for tax purposes. However, 20 
these losses were about to expire under the loss carry-forward 
rules of the United States Internal Revenue Code.  
     In 1985, ᴘᴅʟ borrowed around $7.8 million from the Royal 
Bank of Canada for a 67 day loan ending at the conclusion of 
the fiscal year of both ᴘᴅʟ and ᴘᴅɪ. ᴘᴅʟ forwarded the borrowed 25 
funds into ᴘᴅɪ's account and listed the forwarded funds as a 
capital contribution. On the same day, ᴘᴅɪ purchased a term 
                                                     
35 Alesco New Zealand Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] 2 
NZLR 252 (HC); Alesco New Zealand Limited v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [2013] NZCA 40, [2013] 2 NZLR 175. 
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deposit from the Royal Bank’s London branch, which ᴘᴅɪ used 
as security for the loan to ᴘᴅʟ. The term deposit earned less 
interest than was owed on the loan to ᴘᴅʟ, the interest on the 
loan being 9.625 per cent per annum, and the term deposit 
being 8.75 per cent per annum. The term deposit was also 5 
timed to coincide with the fiscal year end to ensure that the 
interest would be earned by ᴘᴅɪ in 1985 and be absorbed by 
ᴘᴅɪ’s losses in 1980.  
     ᴘᴅɪ set off its accumulated ᴜs losses and paid tax-free 
dividends to ᴘᴅʟ. The amount of the dividends represented the 10 
interest earned by ᴘᴅɪ on the term deposit. ᴘᴅɪ cashed out the 
term deposit and lent it to ᴘᴅʟ to repay the loan it had taken out. 
ᴘᴅʟ claimed a deduction of the interest paid on the loan from 
the Royal Bank of Canada. The sum of the interest paid on the 
money borrowed was $193,684 in 1985 and $898,241 in 1986. 15 
     The Tax Court of Canada held that Mark Resources had not 
breached paragraph 245(1), which contained the “artificial 
reduction” precursor to a ɢᴀᴀʀ. However, the deductions were 
not made for the “purpose of earning income” in paragraph 
20(1)(c), meaning that Mark Resources was not entitled to the 20 
deductions claimed for the interest expense.  
  
 The Arbitrage Advantages and Objectionability C.
 
In both Mark Resources and Alesco, the objectionability of the 25 
transactions to the national tax authorities seems to be derived 
from the arrangements’ cross-border nature.  
     In the case of Alesco, differences in tax treatment between 
Australia and New Zealand gave rise to tax benefits, with the 
Court of Appeal noting that “the ᴏᴄɴs’ attraction lay in this 30 
asymmetrical cross border taxation treatment”.36 ᴏᴄɴs are 
hybrid instruments, which often enjoy different classifications 
of debt or equity under different tax systems, giving rise to 
arbitrage opportunities. In Australia, the tax authorities treated 
ᴏᴄɴs as a 100 per cent equity instrument,37 whereas the New 35 
Zealand system splits the notes into debt and equity 
components. This meant that the interest Alesco ɴᴢ paid to 
Alesco was not assessable in Australia, but the interest paid on 
the debt incurred to finance the acquisitions was deductible by 
Alesco in Australia, subject to thin capitalisation rules.
38
 New 40 
Zealand law allowed Alesco ɴᴢ to claim interest even without a 
corresponding obligation to pay any actual interest, by deeming 
Alesco ɴᴢ to be paying Alesco notional interest, as previously 
explained. The interest paid by Alesco ɴᴢ was not subject to 
                                                     
36 At [14].  
37 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), div 974. 
38 Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth), div 820. 
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resident withholding tax and was tax deductible in New 
Zealand, although Alesco ɴᴢ never actually paid interest.  
     In Mark Resources, the source of the relevant tax benefits 
relates to practices adopted in the absence of a loss 
consolidation regime in the Canadian law, rather than 5 
asymmetries between systems as in Alesco. At the time of Mark 
Resources, Canada had no formal loss consolidation or loss 
transfer rules for a related group of companies.39   This formal 
position means that stand-alone companies are generally taxed 
without recognition of the relationships between members of a 10 
corporate group. This single-entity approach differs from many 
other jurisdictions,40 including New Zealand, where there are 
both loss transfer provisions and group consolidation options 
that allow taxpayers to elect for a group of consolidated 
domestic companies to be treated as if it were one company.41 15 
     In the absence of formal rules for loss consolidation, 
arrangements such as those used in Mark Resources were the 
standard method for consolidating losses between Canadian 
companies. The Canada Revenue Agency (ᴄʀᴀ) did not 
typically challenge this approach. A technical note released by 20 
the ᴄʀᴀ recognised that transactions undertaken to transfer 
income or deductions are a commonplace method of ensuring 
that one member of a corporate group does not pay income 
taxes while another is in a loss position. The ᴄʀᴀ stated that the 
basic parameters to these loss utilisation transactions are simply 25 
that the transactions must be “legally effective and otherwise 
comply with the technical provisions of the Income Tax Act”.42 
The ᴄʀᴀ also observed that the general anti-avoidance rules 
may be relevant, but following from the Department of 
Finance’s explanatory notes for the ɢᴀᴀʀ, loss utilisation 30 
transactions are not usually considered to result in a misuse or 
abuse, therefore the ɢᴀᴀʀ will generally not apply.43 Indeed, the 
Canadian Government has noted that exceptions in rules such 
                                                     
39 Despite much consultation and examination of the issue, the 2013 Federal 
Budget confirmed that introducing a corporate group taxation regime was 
still not a priority. See: Minister of Finance Jobs, Growth, and Long-Term 
Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2013 (March 21, 2013), Annex 2- Tax 
Measures: Supplementary Information and Notices of Ways and Means 
Motions, p 364.  
40 Examples of jurisdictions with different systems include the United 
States, France, Australia, New Zealand, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and 
Spain. See generally: Antony Ting The Taxation of Corporate Groups 
Under Consolidation: An International Comparison (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
41 Section FM 2 of the Income Tax Act 2007 outlines consolidation rules. 
subpart ID of that act deals with the treatment of tax losses by consolidated 
groups and subpart IC allows for losses to be offset between group 
companies.  
42 Canada Revenue Agency, Income Tax: Technical News (Canada Revenue 
Agency, No. 30, May 21 2004) at 6. 
43 Canada Revenue Agency, above n 42, at 6. 
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as the corporate loss limitation rules “are intended to apply with 
respect to transactions that would allow losses, deductions, and 
credits earned by one corporation to be claimed by related 
corporations”.44 Moreover, the explanatory note stated that “the 
scheme of the Income Tax Act as a whole, and the expressed 5 
object and spirit of the corporate loss limitation rules, clearly 
permit such transactions between related corporations where 
these transactions are otherwise legally effective and comply 
with the letter and spirit of these exceptions”.
45
  
     In view of the many statements made by Canadian tax 10 
authorities that recognise arrangements similar to the 
arrangement in Mark Resources as a legitimate method of loss 
consolidation,46 it is difficult to follow Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ’s 
statement that “the consolidation for tax purposes of the 
financial results of domestic companies is not contemplated by 15 
our Act and this holds true a fortiori in the case of foreign 
subsidiaries”.47 Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ labels the loss consolidation 
practice an “administrative concession” which cannot be 
relevant to the decision.48 While a formal regime for loss 
consolidation does not exist in the Income Tax Act, it seems 20 
difficult to sustain an assertion that loss consolidation was not, 
nevertheless, intended to be achieved, at least for domestic 
transactions, through similar arrangements to the one employed 
in Mark Resources. The objection to the use of this method of 
loss consolidation seems to lie instead in the cross-border 25 
dimension of the arrangement. Most likely, this is because this 
transaction imported the losses from the American jurisdiction, 
unacceptably lowering the net tax payable in Canada by 
circumventing the Canadian position whereby the losses of a 
foreign subsidiary cannot be offset by a Canadian parent 30 
against the parent company’s income. Boidman notes that 
before Mark Resources was decided, the Standing Committee 
on Public Accounts of the House of Commons had 
recommended action by the Department of Finance to curtail 
perceived abuses arising from arrangements that involve 35 
importing the losses of foreign subsidiaries.49 This further 
suggests that the Canadian Government viewed cross-border 
                                                     
44 Minister of Finance, Explanatory Notes to Legislation Relating to Income 
Tax (June 1988) at 466. 
45 Minister of Finance, above n 42, at 466. 
46 Additionally, In a 2010 consultation paper, the Canadian Department of 
Finance commented that the flexibility of this approach to loss utilisation 
allowed many corporate groups to use financing arrangements to transfer 
losses: Department of Finance Canada The Taxation of Corporate Groups: 
Consultation Paper (November 2010) at 5. 
47 At [58]. 
48 At [61]. 
49 Nathan Boidman “Mark Resources Inc.: Court Attacks Canada-U.S. Tax 
Avoidance Plan” (1993) 22:9 Tax Man Intl J 499 at 500. 
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loss consolidation arrangements, in particular, as an 
unacceptable threat to the domestic tax base. Accordingly, 
Mark Resources was primarily concerned with the cross-border 
element of the arrangement, rather than its innate structure; the 
objectionability instead lay in the arrangement’s 5 
internationality and the resulting challenge to the Canadian tax 
base. 
      Overall, the result of the Mark Resources arrangement was 
that, for American tax purposes, ᴘᴅɪ was able to utilise the 
losses while avoiding income tax on the interest income 10 
because the interest was sheltered from US income tax by the 
relevant loss carry forward rules.  In Canada, ᴘᴅʟ was able to 
deduct the interest paid on the loan, and ᴘᴅʟ received the 
dividend receipts tax free. The interest income was therefore 
offset for the purposes of calculating ᴘᴅʟ’s foreign accrual 15 
property income.50 
     Paragraph 20(1)(c) continues to contain no restrictions on 
international transactions, although the situation would not 
arise again as it has been addressed by changes in the foreign 
affiliate provisions of the Income Tax Act.51 The changes to the 20 
Act have the result that only losses from property and 
businesses (other than an active business) may reduce foreign 
accrual property income. 
     Neither the Alesco nor the Mark Resources judgment 
appears to consider how international cases are to be 25 
distinguished from domestic arrangements with the same 
structure. This question suggests that placing a greater 
emphasis on economic substance may be appropriate in certain 
situations to differentiate identical domestic transactions from 
cross-border transactions, as the differing economic effects 30 
separate otherwise legally indistinguishable domestic 
arrangements from cross-border arrangements. The legal 
substance of the transaction remains the same whether these 
arrangements occur domestically or internationally, as the 
parties still owe the same substantive obligations. However, as 35 
illustrated by the facts of Mark Resources and Alesco, the 
economic reality can differ because of the disparity between 
rules applied in each jurisdiction or from the use of domestic 
laws in cross-border transactions in a manner not contemplated 
by parliament. 40 
                                                     
50 The Canadian foreign accrual property income (ғᴀᴘɪ) regime taxes the 
passive income of controlled foreign affiliates. The rules are contained in ss 
91-92 of the Income Tax Act RSC 1952 c 148.The purpose of the ғᴀᴘɪ rules 
is to protect the Canadian tax base by preventing passive income from being 
deferred or avoided in foreign jurisdictions. See generally: Jinyan Li and 
Arthur Cockfield and J. Scott Wilkie International Taxation in Canada 
(LexisNexis, Canada, 2006) at 204.  
51 This change was brought about by amendments to the Income Tax Act, s 
93 and to the Income Tax Regulations CRC c 945 reg 5903(1).  
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V. Economic Reality in Alesco and Mark Resources 
 
In both Mark Resources and Alesco, the economic reality of the 
arrangements was central throughout many aspects of the 5 
decision. 
 
A. Framing the Issue 
  
In the case of Alesco, the Court of Appeal initially formulated 10 
the primary issue as being whether Alesco’s use of the financial 
arrangements rules and determination G22 to claim deductions 
for expenditure fell outside of Parliament’s contemplation 
when enacting the rules.52 The Court of Appeal was evidently 
concerned to frame the issue in a way that was an entirely 15 
orthodox application of the Supreme Court’s parliamentary 
contemplation test, as formulated in Ben Nevis.53 The 
parliamentary contemplation test first considers whether the use 
made of a specific provision was within its intended scope, and 
then whether the use of the provision, viewed in the light of the 20 
arrangement as a whole, was nevertheless used in a way that 
was outside of Parliament’s contemplation when it enacted the 
provision.54 
     The Court of Appeal in Alesco went on to reformulate the 
question in two different stages. From the starting point, where 25 
the phrasing of the central issue adopted the language and 
construction of the parliamentary contemplation test,55 the issue 
was rephrased until the ultimate question was expressed as:  
“should the anti-avoidance provisions be applied in a way that 
ignores the economic reality of the ᴏᴄɴs as contemplated by the 30 
deductibility provisions and G22?”.56 The court describes these 
reformulations as being mere repetitions of the same central 
question “expressed slightly differently”.57 However, with each 
rephrasing of the issue, the emphasis shifts towards the 
economic substance of the arrangement. The result of this 35 
reframing of the issue is that the substantive economic reality 
of an arrangement became the dominant and explicit concern in 
                                                     
52 At [56]. 
53 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd & Ors v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue [2009] NZSC 40, [2009] 2 NZLR 358. 
54 Craig Elliffe and Jess Cameron “The Test for Tax Avoidance in New 
Zealand: A Judicial Sea Change” (2010) 16 NZBLQ 440 at 449. 
55 The Court of Appeal initially phrased the question at [56]: “if it is 
established that Alesco NZ did not incur either a legal liability to pay 
interest or any economic cost on the loan, did its use of the financial 
arrangements rules and G22 to claim income tax deductions for expenditure 
incurred fall outside Parliament’s contemplation when enacting the rules?  
56 At [56]. 
57 At [56]. 
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delineating acceptable and unacceptable avoidance. These 
reformulations of the parliamentary contemplation test move 
the issue towards one of economic reality and equate the 
parliamentary contemplation test with an inquiry into economic 
substance; Parliament is presumed to intend that the anti-5 
avoidance provisions are applied in a way that reflects the 
economic reality of the arrangement. While many cases have 
expressed economic reality as a backdrop principle informing 
the parliamentary contemplation test, it is unusual for a New 
Zealand court to read it into the test as explicitly as it is in 10 
Alesco. This recognition of economic substance further 
suggests the growing significance of the doctrine, and 
maintains consistency with the purpose of the financial 
arrangement rules, which is to reflect the economic reality of 
these financial arrangements.  15 
     Mark Resources similarly placed great weight on the 
economic substance of the arrangement in the way it framed the 
primary issue, although interestingly, this seemed to be 
exclusively considered in relation to deductibility under the 
paragraph 20(1)(c) heading, rather than when considering the 20 
artificiality provision of paragraph 245(1). Indeed, when 
considering artificiality, Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ followed the decision in 
Irving,
58
 and held that “the borrowing at a rate that does not and 
cannot yield an economic return as a means of achieving a 
predetermined economic result is in itself not artificial”.59 It is 25 
difficult to reconcile the conclusion that the arrangement did 
not meet the purpose test of paragraph 20(1)(c) with the 
conclusion that the arrangement was not artificial under  
paragraph 245(1).60 Paragraph 245(1), which was the functional 
equivalent of the ɢᴀᴀʀ, was more specifically targeted at tax 30 
avoidance transactions than the purpose test read into paragraph 
20(1)(c). Accordingly, paragraph 245(1) seems to provide a 
less complicated route to arrive at the decision against the 
taxpayer, as well as a more natural path for considering 
economic realities. Indeed, the New Zealand bank conduit 35 
cases came to the opposite conclusion regarding the borrowing 
of interest at a rate that does not yield an economic return,61 
which allowed the court to arrive at a decision against the 
taxpayer through a much neater and less conflicting analysis 
than was available under paragraph 20(1)(c). 40 
                                                     
58 Canada v. Irving Oil Ltd. [1991] 1 CTC 350, 91 DTC 5106. 
59 At [31]. 
60 Boidman remarks on the “apparent conflict between the two findings in: 
“Nathan Boidman “Mark Resources Inc.: Court Attacks Canada-U.S. Tax 
Avoidance Plan” (1993) 22:9 Tax Man Intl J 499 at 503. 
61 BNZ Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2009) CIV-
2004-485-1059 (HC), 24 NZTC 23; Westpac Banking Corporation v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (2009) CIV-2005-404-2843 (HC), 24 
NZTC 23. 
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     This further highlights the significance of judicial context 
for the application of economic substance. Absent of the Irving 
precedent, Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ may have been able to deal with 
economic substance more straightforwardly under paragraph  
245(1), in a way similar to the New Zealand courts in the bank 5 
conduit cases. Instead, Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ framed the issue as being 
whether deductions under paragraph 20(1)(c) were allowable 
for an arrangement that had the utilisation of losses of the 
American subsidiary as the “economic object”.
62
 Similar to 
Alesco, there was no statutory cue to examine the “economic 10 
object” of the transaction, but the statute was interpreted so that 
this inquiry was a corollary of the “purpose” requirement of 
paragraph 20(1)(c). 
 
B. Arguments Related to Economic Substance 15 
  
Furthermore, the arguments advanced in Alesco and Mark 
Resources responded to the court’s preoccupation with 
substantive economic reality.  
     Alesco argued that the financial arrangement rules and 20 
determination G22 accurately identified the economic 
substance of the ᴏᴄɴs as involving debt and equity components. 
If Alesco’s argument was correct it would follow that the 
statutory provisions in combination with determination G22, 
which presupposed a genuine interest cost to Alesco NZ as the 25 
issuer of the notes, reflected the intention of Parliament. The 
Commissioner argued that the purpose of the ᴏᴄɴs was to alter 
the incidence of tax without suffering a real economic cost 
under the ᴏᴄɴs. 
     In Mark Resources, the appellant argued that ᴘᴅʟ had used 30 
the borrowed money to earn dividend income, and that this was 
the economic object of the arrangement. The Minister argued 
that the focus should be on the direct use of the funds, rather 
than on their underlying purpose, and that the direct use of the 
borrowed money was to contribute capital to ᴘᴅɪ, despite this 35 
contribution producing no economic income.  
 
C. Focus of the Reasoning 
 
Throughout the Alesco decision, the economic reality of an 40 
arrangement is linked back to Parliament’s contemplation, on 
the basis of the conclusion that Parliament would not have 
contemplated that the statutory deduction rules would apply in 
the absence of a real economic consequence to those seeking to 
take advantage of the rules. To this end, the Court of Appeal 45 
affirmed that the financial arrangement rules were intended to 
                                                     
62 At [1]. 
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give effect to “real economic benefits and costs”.
63
 Alesco’s 
argument was therefore dismissed on the basis that the financial 
arrangements rules were “intended to give effect to the reality 
of income and expenditure- that is real economic benefits and 
costs”.
64
 In view of this purpose of the rules, the Court of 5 
Appeal held that Parliament would not have contemplated that 
Alesco would be able to use the financial arrangement rules to 
claim deductions for notional interest when interest was not 
paid and there was no liability to pay it. By explaining the 
purpose of the financial rules as being to give effect to 10 
economic reality rather than to the legal or accounting form or 
treatment of the arrangement, economic reality remains the 
decisive factor in this judgment.  
     In Mark Resources, Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ agreed that the direct use 
of the borrowed funds was the injection of capital into ᴘᴅɪ, but 15 
added that the necessary intended consequence was that ᴘᴅɪ 
would earn interest and pay dividends to ᴘᴅʟ. Yet Bowman 
ᴛᴄᴄᴊ ultimately found that the “real purpose” of the borrowed 
funds was the importation of losses from the United States. In 
this sense, Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ focused on the purpose requirement of 20 
the section so emphatically that he effectively read into 
paragraph 20(1)(c) a substantive anti-avoidance test, which was 
based on the “true purpose” of the funds, to be understood with 
reference to the economic consequences of the arrangement. 
The test considered what the overriding and “ultimate 25 
economic objectives” of the money was.
65
 Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ 
explained that “it is true that the overall economic result… is a 
net gain to the appellant, but this type of gain is not from the 
production of income but from a reduction of taxes otherwise 
payable in Canada”.
66
 The earning of dividend income could 30 
not be regarded as the ultimate economic purpose of the 
arrangement since this net economic gain was derived from the 
tax benefits. As a result of this focus on the ultimate economic 
purpose of the arrangement, the conclusion was that the interest 
was not deductible under paragraph 20(1)(c) as the money was 35 
held not to have been borrowed for the purpose of earning 
income.  
     Thus, in both cases, despite the materially similar statutes 
operating in Canada and New Zealand, both of which did not 
expressly require consideration of economic substance, the 40 
economic reality of the arrangement was central to the courts’ 
analysis and findings against the taxpayer, which is evident in 
the way the issue is framed, argued, and decided. 
 
                                                     
63 At [71]. 
64 At [70].  
65 At [45]. 
66 At [45]. 
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D. Other Indicators: Artificiality and Commercial 
Reality 
 
On the surface, Alesco and Mark Resources are analysed 
against numerous other indicators of avoidance, such as 5 
“artificiality” or “commercial reality”. Yet, a closer inspection 
of these indicators reveals that they are often firmly grounded 
in the concept of economic reality.  
     For instance, both cases describe “artificiality” as a 
significant indicator of avoidance. Alesco cited a passage of 10 
Ben Nevis that described an “artificial or contrived” use of a 
specific provision as being a “classic indicator” of avoidance.67 
In Mark Resources, the wording of paragraph 245(1) prescribed 
artificiality as being the central hallmark of avoidance. 
However, the notion of “artificiality” adopted in these cases is 15 
closely tied to the concept of economic substance. That is to 
say, whether an arrangement is artificial is largely determined 
in accordance with whether it lacks economic substance.  
     In Alesco, the ᴏᴄɴs were held to be artificial on the basis that 
Alesco ɴᴢ was already a wholly owned subsidiary.  That is, the 20 
option to convert the notes to shares at the end of the ten-year 
period was artificial because Alesco already had the ability to 
issue more shares. The High Court observed that if Alesco had 
exercised the option, “no change to Alesco NZ‘s status as a 
wholly owned subsidiary would have been effected” by having 25 
78,1000,000 shares rather than 100,000. The crux of this 
finding is located in the arrangement’s economic substance; the 
option had no economic value, because even without the ᴏᴄɴs 
Alesco, as the holder of 100 per cent of Alesco ɴᴢ’s capital, 
was able to procure the issue of new shares. Therefore, 30 
according to the underlying economic substance, the court held 
that the ᴏᴄɴs were an artificial interest free loan, which should 
not receive the interest deductions arising under the financial 
arrangement rules. 
     Mark Resources took a different view of artificiality, which 35 
was more concerned with the legal substance of the 
arrangement. The legal technique adopted by Mark Resources 
was not artificial because the arrangement involved “real 
transactions” and despite the fact that ᴘᴅʟ borrowed the money 
at a higher rate than the anticipated return, the interest was still 40 
not excessive. It is difficult to square this focus on legal 
substance under the artificiality inquiry of paragraph 245(1) 
with the strong focus on economic substance in relation to 
deductibility under paragraph 20(1)(c). This shift in approach 
may be explicable in view of the influence of the Federal Court 45 
                                                     
67 At [22]. 
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of Appeal’s decision in Canada v. Irving Oil Ltd.
68
 In that case, 
an arrangement involving an offshore company that sat 
between the taxpayer’s suppliers and the taxpayer, which 
served no purpose other than to increase the price of the oil, 
was not artificial because the price was still found to be at fair 5 
market value.  The Court in Mark Resources stated that “if the 
Irving scheme was not artificial this one cannot be”,69 leaving 
deductibility under paragraph 20(1)(c) as the alternative avenue 
to reach the result against the taxpayer through  reasoning 
based on economic reality.  10 
     In this respect, Mark Resources may have missed an 
opportunity to moderate the Irving precedent, which is open to 
criticism. The Irving conclusion that the existence of market 
value prices shields the arrangement from being considered 
artificial should be resisted because while market value may 15 
provide valuable evidence of what the taxpayer’s income is, it 
cannot be determinative to the issue of artificiality as there may 
be good reasons why a market value price is not paid in certain 
circumstances. In the New Zealand case of Penny v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, where two orthopaedic 20 
surgeons structured their business to pay artificially low 
salaries, the findings on artificiality were reached without 
giving significant recognition to the fair market salary.70 The 
Supreme Court noted that it is commonplace for family 
transactions to not be based on market valuations,71 which 25 
recognises that market value is only one factor going towards 
artificiality, which may be displaced by other circumstances. 
     Mark Resources and Alesco also considered commercial 
reality as an indicator of avoidance. The Court of Appeal did 
not impugn the underlying commercial rationale of the 30 
transaction in Alesco, because Alesco ɴᴢ was pursuing the real 
commercial objective of acquiring the businesses. However, the 
Commissioner still challenged the particular ᴏᴄɴ arrangement 
chosen to fulfil this objective on the basis that it was not 
commercially realistic. The Court agreed with this, observing 35 
that there was no commercial purpose for the ᴏᴄɴs, 
predominantly because of the lack of economic value that the 
arrangement had for Alesco. Thus, the conclusion that the 
arrangement was not commercially realistic was again 
essentially based on the lack of economic substance of the ᴏᴄɴ 40 
option. 
     The notion of economic substance also underpins the 
discussion of commercial reality in Mark Resources. The court 
                                                     
68 Canada v. Irving Oil Ltd. [1991] 1 CTC 350, 91 DTC 5106. 
69 At [31]. 
70 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 95, [2012] 1 
NZLR 433 at [47]. 
71 At [49]. 
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cited Irving again in support of the proposition that a fair 
market price “offend[s] no principles of commercial 
normality”.72 This duplicates the focus on economic substance 
for the same reasons the Court gave when considering 
“artificiality” in Mark Resources.  5 
  
VI. Mark Resources and Alesco in Context 
 
The treatment of economic substance in Mark Resources and 
Alesco must be viewed in the appropriate jurisprudential 10 
context. While there is similarity in the intent of the legislation 
and in the way that neither the Canadian nor the New Zealand 
statutes directly prescribed economic substance to be part of the 
avoidance inquiry, the judicial analysis of economic reality in 
New Zealand and Canada has differed significantly.  15 
     Generally, New Zealand has more readily accepted 
economic substance as an indicator of avoidance. Ben Nevis 
stands as the most authoritative case from the New Zealand 
Supreme Court on the issue of avoidance.73 In Ben Nevis, 
economic reality was undoubtedly significant, with the court 20 
emphasising that transactions were to be viewed in a 
“commercially and economically realistic” way.
74
 Additionally, 
the decision itself reflected a willingness to look behind the 
form of the transaction.75 Similarly, the importance of 
economic substance was affirmed in Glenharrow,76 where the 25 
Supreme Court decision against the taxpayer held that “the 
intention of the [1985 Goods and Services Tax] Act will be 
defeated if an arrangement has been structured to enable the 
avoidance of output tax, or the obtaining of an input deduction 
in circumstances where that consequence is outside the purpose 30 
and contemplation of the relevant statutory provisions”.77 
Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue was consistent with 
this line of Supreme Court authority. The court found that “the 
                                                     
72 At [29]. 
73 The Supreme Court has also delivered tax avoidance judgments under the 
ɢᴀᴀʀ in Glenharrow Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, below n 59, 
and Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, below n 61. However, 
Glenharrow concerned the ɢᴀᴀʀ under the Goods and Services Tax Act 
1985, and Penny v Hooper followed Ben Nevis.  
74 At [109]. 
75 The Supreme Court decided that despite formal compliance with the 
provisions for deductions and depreciation allowances, the promissory notes 
given in Ben Nevis were not, in substance, payment because the economic 
burden of payment was lacking.  
76 Glenharrow Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 116, 
[2009] 2 NZ 
77 At [40]. 
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taxpayers suffered no actual loss of income but obtained a 
reduction in liability to tax as if they had”.78  
     The approach of the Canadian courts has typically been 
marked by a much greater reluctance to look to the economic 
substance of an arrangement as a key determinant of avoidance. 5 
There is a spattering of judgments that support economic reality 
and the reasoning of Mark Resources, such as Bronfman Trust, 
which considered the trend towards “true commercial and 
practical nature of the taxpayer's transactions” to be laudable.
79
  
However, judgments subsequent to Mark Resources, such as 10 
Shell Canada and Singleton have rejected this approach.80 
     Following Mark Resources, Bowman ᴛᴄᴄᴊ initially affirmed 
the economic realities reasoning in Singleton in the Federal 
Court of Appeal,81 even repeating some parts of the Mark 
Resources decision verbatim. However, the true economic 15 
purpose reasoning was later rejected in Singleton at the 
Supreme Court in the wake of Shell Canada, despite Mark 
Resources being selectively cited by the Supreme Court as a 
“significant decision” of the lower courts on economic realities 
jurisprudence.82 The Shell Canada decision was determined 20 
under the same former paragraph 245(1) as Mark Resources.83 
Shell Canada
84
 emphasised the distinction between legal and 
economic substance, with the court holding that the economic 
substance cannot prevail over the legal substance. The Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the “courts must be sensitive to the 25 
economic realities of a particular transaction, rather than being 
bound to what first appears to be its legal form”.85 However, 
this endorsement of economic reality was drastically limited by 
two significant caveats. First, that economic realities could not 
be used to recharacterise bona fide legal relationships, and 30 
secondly, that an inquiry into economic realities could not 
replace the duty of the Court to apply clear and unambiguous 
statutory terms. Arnold and Li observe that although Shell 
Canada does not expressly reject all consideration of economic 
reality, it severely reduces its relevance because it is difficult to 35 
contemplate a situation where economic reality would be 
relevant, outside of the characterisation of an arrangement, 
                                                     
78 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 95, [2012] 1 
NZLR 433 at [47]. 
79 Bronfman Trust v The Queen [1987] 1 SCR 32 at [39]. 
80 Shell Canada Ltd. v Canada 2005 SCC 54, [1999] 3 SCR 622; Singleton v 
Canada 2001 SCC 61, [2001] 2 SCR 1046. 
81 The Queen v Singleton (1996) DTC 1850. 
82 At [51]. 
83 The former section applied because the relevant debenture agreements 
and forward exchange contract were entered into prior to the enactment of 
the Canadian ɢᴀᴀʀ in 1988. 
84 Shell Canada, above n 80. 
85 At [39]. 
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unless a provision expressly referred to economic reality, which 
is very unusual.86 This near-total rejection of economic reality 
in Singleton and Shell Canada leads Akin to summarise the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s view as being that “legally binding 
relationships created by a taxpayer’s transactions cannot be 5 
ignored or recharacterized for tax purposes, notwithstanding the 
fact that those transactions may have been entered into solely 
for tax purposes”.87 
     The tide may be turning following the enactment of the ɢᴀᴀʀ 
in Canada. McNichol88 the first case to consider the Canadian 10 
ɢᴀᴀʀ, required that a surplus-stripping transaction be “viewed 
realistically”,89 seemingly invoking economic reality. In 
Trustco,
90
 the Canadian Supreme Court’s seminal consideration 
of the ɢᴀᴀʀ noted that economic substance is indeed relevant at 
various stages of the analysis, but that it must be considered in 15 
relation to the proper interpretation of the specific provisions 
involved.91 The court in Trustco quoted from the explanatory 
notes that “Subsection 245(4) recognizes that the provisions of 
the Act are intended to apply to transactions with real economic 
substance, not to transactions intended to exploit, misuse or 20 
frustrate the Act to avoid tax.”92 This recognition of economic 
substance suggests a shift back in the direction of the Mark 
Resources decision.93 
    Both Mark Resources and Alesco sit within significantly 
different contexts. While New Zealand has typically been alert 25 
to economic reality, Mark Resources stands as an outlier in its 
jurisdiction in terms of its willingness to look to economic 
realities. Consequently, later Supreme Court cases severely 
limited Mark Resources. However, following the enactment of 
the ɢᴀᴀʀ, there is some suggestion that the wide rejection of an 30 
approach involving the recharacterisation of a transaction 
according to its economic substance, may be changing.  
     Leave has been granted to Alesco to appeal to the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand on the ground of whether, in the light of 
the principles laid down in Ben Nevis and other tax avoidance 35 
cases, the structure used for funding the transactions is a tax 
                                                     
86 Brian J. Arnold and Jinyan Li “Justice Bowman on Substance over Form” 
(2010) 58 Can Tax J 127 at 129-130. 
87 Tom Akin “Canada” (paper presented as part of the American Bar 
Association – Section of Taxation Meeting, Washington D.C., May 2004). 
88 McNichol et al. v The Queen (1997) 97 DTC 111.  
89 At [25]. 
90 Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada 2011 SCC 36, [2005] 2 SCR 
601. 
91 At [76]. 
92 At [48]. 
93 But see Tom Aikin and others “Economic Substance Around the World 
(Part 1)” (2005) 16(1) JIT 50 at 55 (“… the Canadian judiciary has 
generally rejected use of the [economic substance] test even after the 
enactment of the general anti-avoidance rule”). 
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avoidance arrangement. It will be interesting to observe 
whether the Court of Appeal’s decision will attract as much 
judicial criticism as Mark Resources received in later 
judgments, although an examination of the New Zealand 
context, which has paid much closer attention to economic 5 
substance, suggests that a similar response is unlikely.  
 
VII. Criticisms of Economic Realities Jurisprudence 
 
Shell Canada contains the most direct criticism of Mark 10 
Resources. Shell was particularly critical of the economic 
substance reasoning used in Mark Resources, stating that a 
“misplaced reliance on ‘economic realities’ caused the court to 
stray from the express terms of s. 20(1)(c)(i)”.94 The concern 
expressed in Shell was that deference to economic substance 15 
would overshadow conventional statutory interpretation of the 
specific section invoked and, in turn, the legislative function of 
Parliament would be usurped. The court in Shell warned against 
the judiciary importing economic policy concerns into the 
inquiry when Parliament did not seek to introduce economic 20 
policy. McMechan labels this as a concern against “judicial 
redrafting”.
95
  
     The argument against “judicial redrafting” was perhaps 
more persuasive before the enactment of the ɢᴀᴀʀ in Canada, 
which has mandated a greater scope for the courts to define the 25 
borders of tax mitigation and avoidance. Indeed, the 
introduction of the ɢᴀᴀʀ seems to have been highly influential 
in the recognition of economic reality by the Supreme Court in 
Canada Trustco, where the court acknowledged that the ɢᴀᴀʀ 
“superimposed a prohibition on abusive tax avoidance” that 30 
would necessitate a less literal approach to the Act’s provisions, 
and affirmed that economic substance is relevant at various 
stages of the analysis.96 Arnold cautions that the failure to 
afford sufficient importance to economic reality will actually 
render the ɢᴀᴀʀ ineffective and defeat the entire purpose of its 35 
introduction.97 
    McMechan considers New Zealand’s approach to be “light 
years away from where Canadian courts presently are in regard 
to recognition of the essential role that economic substance 
plays in tax avoidance cases” and concludes that a legislative 40 
push would be required to bring the Canadian jurisprudence in 
line.  Yet, while the few tax cases to come before New 
                                                     
94 At [43].  
95 Robert McMechan Economic Substance and Tax Avoidance: An 
International Perspective (Carswell, Canada, 2013) at 108.  
96 McMechan above n 95, at 76. 
97 Brian J. Arnold “The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-
Avoidance Rule” (2005) 52(2) Can Tax J 488 at 510. 
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Zealand’s Supreme Court have been a relatively recent 
phenomenon, it should not be forgotten that New Zealand has 
had a significantly longer time to adapt to the environment 
established by a ɢᴀᴀʀ, with the first general anti-avoidance 
provision introduced in 1873,
98
 and the first application of such 5 
a provision to income tax in 1891.99 The approach to the 
Canadian ɢᴀᴀʀ, enacted almost a century later in 1988, may 
simply take time to evolve. Bearing in mind this comparatively 
short timeframe since the enactment of the ɢᴀᴀʀ, additional 
measures such as amendments to the ɢᴀᴀʀ expressly directing 10 
consideration of economic substance may be unnecessary 
action for a problem that may soon resolve itself. 
     Additionally, the concern about “judicial redrafting” 
overlooks the unique nature of tax law that demands that the 
courts play an active role in gap filling and closing loopholes, 15 
as the legislature simply cannot predict some of the 
arrangements that taxpayers create.100 Indeed, the prompt 
enactment of new rules to close legislative gaps and prevent 
similar situations from arising by New Zealand and Canadian 
tax authorities seems to vindicate the Court’s interpretation of 20 
parliamentary contemplation based on economic reasoning in 
Mark Resources and Alesco. 
     Moreover, cross-border arbitrage, in particular, requires the 
attention of the courts, because arbitrage arrangements are 
particularly effective at complying technically with the letter of 25 
the law while acting outside of parliament’s contemplation. 
Unlike wholly domestic attempts at avoidance, cross-border 
arrangements are very often able to conform very strictly to the 
legal requirements or entitlements, as well as the domestic 
economic policy, under the respective tax regimes. In this way, 30 
profit is derived from exploiting conflicting or inconsistent 
rules, rather than from exploiting ambiguities within a domestic 
regime. Therefore, it is easier to comply technically and 
formalistically with the laws and economic policy of the two 
jurisdictions than to strain the statutory regime within a single 35 
jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
                                                     
98 Land Tax Act 1878, s 62. 
99 Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1891, s 40. 
See generally Craig Elliffe and John Prebble "General Anti-Avoidance 
Rules and Double Tax Agreements: A New Zealand Perspective" (2009) 
19(1) Revenue Law Journal 1 at 4. 
100 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble “Does The Use Of General Anti-
Avoidance Rules To Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule 
of Law?” (2012) 2 VUWLRP 8 at 38; Brian M Studniberg “Minding the 
Gap in Tax Interpretation: Does Specificity Oust the General Anti-
Avoidance Rule Post-Copthorne?” (2012) 38:1 Queen’s LJ 209 at 210. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
In some situations, such as those present in Alesco and Mark 
Resources, cross-border tax arbitrage may amount to tax 
avoidance. In both of these decisions, consideration of the 5 
economic substance of the arrangements was paramount, even 
in the absence of any specific legislative demands to look to 
economic reality. The concern for economic substance 
permeates the cases; the legal issues and tests are phrased to 
position economic substance as a dominant factor for analysis, 10 
counsels’ arguments reflect this concern, the reasoning adopted 
in these cases focuses strongly on economic substance, and 
other existing indicators of avoidance are closely tied to notions 
of economic reality. This focus is a consistent, albeit more 
explicit, expression of New Zealand tax avoidance 15 
jurisprudence. In comparison, the approach to economic reality 
in Canada varies significantly. The difficulty that the Court in 
Mark Resources had in bringing an economic substance 
analysis into the decision in a straightforward way, as well as 
the subsequent rejection of the Mark Resources analysis in 20 
several significant decisions reflects this inconsistent, and often 
reluctant, consideration of the doctrine in Canada. The 
introduction of the Canadian ɢᴀᴀʀ may reverse this trend and 
bring the Canadian approach to economic realities in line with 
New Zealand. This change would be desirable because, viewed 25 
in context, Alesco and Mark Resources affirm that the centrality 
of economic reality in a way that appropriately reflects the 
importance of the concept to determining the boundaries of 
avoidance in cross-border arbitrage. 
  30 
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IX.  Appendix 
 
Income Tax Act 2004 (New Zealand) 
 
BG 1 Tax avoidance 
 
Avoidance arrangement void 
(1) A tax avoidance arrangement is void as against the Commissioner for income tax 
purposes. 
 
Reconstruction 
(2) Under Part G (Avoidance and non-market transactions), the Commissioner may 
counteract a tax advantage that a person has obtained from or under a tax avoidance 
arrangement. 
 
 
OB 1 Definitions 
 
Arrangement means any contract, agreement, plan, or understanding (whether 
enforceable or unenforceable), including all steps and transactions by which it is carried 
into effect: 
 
tax avoidance includes— 
 
(a) directly or indirectly altering the incidence of any income tax: 
 
(b) directly or indirectly relieving a person from liability to pay income tax 
or from a potential or prospective liability to future income tax: 
 
(c) directly or indirectly avoiding, postponing, or reducing any liability to 
income tax or any potential or prospective liability to future income tax 
 
Tax avoidance arrangement means an arrangement, whether entered into by the person 
affected by the arrangement or by another person, that directly or indirectly– 
 
(a) Has tax avoidance as its purpose or effect; or 
 
(b) Has tax avoidance as one of its purposes or effects, whether or not any 
other purpose or effect is referable to ordinary business or family dealings, 
if the purpose or effect is not merely incidental. 
 
 
Income Tax Act RSC 1952 c 148 (Canada)  
 
20 Deductions permitted in computing income from business or property 
 
(1) Notwithstanding paragraphs 18(1)(a),(b) and (h), in computing a taxpayer's income 
for a taxation year from a business or property, there may be deducted such of the 
30 
 
following amounts as are wholly applicable to that source or such part of the following 
amounts as may reasonably be regarded as applicable thereto: 
 
. . . .  
 
(c) an amount paid in the year or payable in respect of the year (depending upon the 
method regularly followed by the taxpayer in computing his income), pursuant to a legal 
obligation to pay interest on 
 
(i) borrowed money used for the purpose of earning income from a 
business or property (other than borrowed money used to acquire 
property the income from which would be exempt or to acquire a 
life insurance policy), 
 
(ii) an amount payable for property acquired for the purpose of gaining or 
producing income therefrom or for the purpose of gaining or producing 
income from a business (other than property the income from which would 
be exempt or property that is an interest in a life insurance policy), 
 
or a reasonable amount in respect thereof, whichever is the lesser. 
 
 
245 Artificial Transactions 
 
(1) In computing income for the purposes of this Act, no deduction may be made in 
respect of a disbursement or expense made or incurred in respect of a transaction or 
operation that, if allowed, would unduly or artificially reduce the income. 
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